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BEYOND BEYOND CONJUGALITY
Brenda Cossman* and Bruce Ryder**
FIFTEEN YEARS BEYOND BEYOND CONJUGALITY
In 2001, the Law Commission of Canada (LCC) released its
report Beyond Conjugality: Recognizing and Supporting Close
Adult Relationships.1 In the report, the LCC sought to rethink
the ways in which conjugality has been used by legislatures and
governments as a proxy for the recognition of adult personal
relationships and the legal distribution of rights and
responsibilities. Conjugality, it argued, was a poor proxy for the
relational attributes relevant to legislative objectives. The LCC
argued that the law should more carefully tailor its definitions of
adult personal relationships to the underlying objectives of state
regulation.
The Beyond Conjugality report has been extensively
debated and cited since its release. Even though it is too early,
from the Law Commission’s long-term perspective, to come up
with a final assessment of the contributions made by the Beyond
Conjugality report, this paper assesses the report’s impact on
scholarly and political debates thus far. We consider whether the
assumptions and methodology underlying the report remain
*
**
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valuable. By stopping short of recommending that the state cease
to regulate marriage altogether, and by not recommending the
repeal of conjugal offences such as polygamy, did the report not
go far enough? With the benefits of hindsight, would we urge
the Commission to write the report differently now? To what
extent did the recognition of same sex marriage in Canada in
2005 close down any further reconsideration of adult personal
relationships? Is the model of conjugality that the report
criticized more entrenched today? Should the Commission have
written the report differently to give further political and legal
resonance to alternatives to conjugality? Specifically, how might
the report have better addressed the question of the dyadic
couple versus multiple party relationships?
I – THE RECOMMENDATIONS AND METHODOLOGY
OF BEYOND CONJUGALITY
In Beyond Conjugality, the LCC sought to rethink the ways in
which conjugality has been used by legislatures and
governments as a proxy for the recognition of adult personal
relationships and the distribution of rights and responsibilities.
Conjugality, it argued, was a poor proxy for the relational
attributes relevant to legislative objectives. The LCC argued that
the law should more carefully tailor its definitions of adult
personal relationships to the underlying objectives of state
regulation. For any existing or proposed law that employs
relational terms to accomplish its objectives, it proposed a fourpart methodology for considering the relevance and regulation
of relationships. First, government should consider whether the
objective of the particular law is legitimate. Second, if the law’s
objective is sound, the government should consider whether
relationships are actually relevant. Third, government should
expand the options to allow people to determine status for
themselves through various self-designation mechanisms,
including an expansion of registration options and marriage to
same-sex couples. Fourth, when government imposition or
ascription of relationship status is appropriate (because
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relationships do matter, and self-designation is not feasible),
then the operative definitions of the relevant relationships need
to be revised.2
This tiered methodology aimed to create momentum
towards more careful thinking about legislative reliance on
relationships. Where relationships are relevant, the report sought
to put the power to determine which relationships are most
important in individuals’ hands. When that is not feasible, the
report encouraged governments and legislatures to rethink the
functional definitions they use to ascribe relational status so that
the focus is on relevant criteria. In particular, the report focused
on emotional intimacy and economic interdependence as two
functional relational attributes important across a number of
contexts. The report’s language also suggested that shared
residence should be a third potentially relevant functional
attribute in some circumstances. Instead of focusing on whether
individuals were living in spousal or conjugal relationships,
it proposed a focus on whether they were living in relationships
characterized by emotional and economic interdependence. 3
While the Commission ultimately recommended that a range of
definitions need to be carefully tailored to particular statutory
contexts, the themes of economic and emotional intimacy ran
through the solutions that the report proposed.
At the time of the LCC’s work on the Beyond
Conjugality report, the struggle to achieve legal recognition of
same-sex marriage in Canada was at an intense stage. Gay and
lesbian couples were on the brink of a wave of litigation success
across the country.4 The Commission was firmly of the view that
2
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the exclusion of same-sex couples from the right to marry was
discriminatory on the basis of sexual orientation, and that the
logic of the equality rights in section 15 of the Canadian Charter
of Rights and Freedoms led inexorably to that conclusion, even
though it had been resisted by the courts up to that point. As the
LCC put it in the Beyond Conjugality report, the capacity to
form conjugal relationships characterized by emotional and
economic interdependence has nothing to do with sexual
orientation. 5 Therefore, [i]f governments are to continue to
maintain an institution called marriage, they cannot do so in a
discriminatory fashion. 6
In the years immediately following the release of
Beyond Conjugality, a series of courts reached the same
conclusion, culminating in appeal court rulings legalizing samesex marriage in British Columbia, Ontario, and Quebec.7 Faced
with this speedy emergence of a new judicial consensus about
the appropriate legal bounds of conjugal coupledom, the federal
government abandoned any further appeals. Shortly thereafter,
the government unveiled the Civil Marriage Act. After receiving

5

Supra note 1 at 130.

6

Ibid.

7

Hendricks c Québec (Procureure générale), [2004] RJQ 851, 238 DLR
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a seal of approval from the Supreme Court of Canada,8 the Act
was adopted by Parliament in 2005.9 The central provision of the
Act redefined civil marriage for the nation as a whole as the
lawful union of two persons to the exclusion of all others. 10
While the LCC had no doubts about adding its voice in
2001 to the condemnation of the exclusion of gay and lesbians
from the right to marry, this was not its priority for the Beyond
Conjugality report. Indeed, we think it is fair to say the LCC was
frustrated by the failure of opponents and proponents of samesex marriage to engage with the larger issues. The LCC’s
priority in the Beyond Conjugality project was to move beyond
and unsettle the parameters of the equal marriage debate by
interrogating the state’s role in recognizing and supporting adult
personal relationships more generally. The timing of Beyond
Conjugality was not accidental. The LCC aimed to take
advantage of the discursive space opened up by the struggle for
same-sex marriage to interrogate the legal relevance of
conjugality to contemporary state objectives.
The boundaries of who was included in coupled
conjugality had been shifting for some time and were about to
shift even more dramatically. Largely submerged in the public
and legal debates about the boundaries of coupled conjugality
was any sustained critical interrogation of the legal content and
consequences of conjugality. The LCC assumed that conjugality
had to be defined without discrimination on the basis of marital
status or sexual orientation; the more urgent project, from the
point of view of its mandate, was to bring a critical reassessment
of the uses of conjugality as a legal category to the fore. This
choice is evident in the structure of the LCC’s report: the issue
of same-sex marriage is deferred until the last section of the
8
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report, and received only two pages of discussion. 11 Some
advocates of same-sex marriage were unhappy with the LCC’s
approach. Strategically, they thought it wisest to defer a critical
conversation about conjugality until after the achievement of
same-sex marriage. And they were suspicious of the LCC’s
attempt to promote a fundamental reconsideration of marriage’s
legal design at the precise moment that gay and lesbian couples
were on the threshold of inclusion.
II – POLITICAL AFTERMATH OF BEYOND
CONJUGALITY
The Law Commission of Canada Act 12 grants the LCC an
expansive mandate, one that seeks to address fundamental
questions rather than more narrow or technical issues of law
reform. The role of the LCC set out in the statute is to keep the
law and its effects under systematic review in order to provide
independent advice on improvements, modernization and
reform that will ensure a just legal system that meets the
changing needs of Canadian society .13 The preamble provides
that the commission should adopt a multidisciplinary approach
to its work that views the law and the legal system in a broad
social and economic context .14
We had the privilege of working with the LCC for
several years on its work that culminated in the Beyond
Conjugality report. We wrote a background paper for the
commission in 2000, and we were hired by the commission to
continue working on the preparation of the final report in 2000
and 2001. The LCC’s research process consisted of a
11

Beyond Conjugality, supra note 1 at 129 31.
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preliminary identification of issues related to its broader
research focus on personal relationships, drawing on a series of
background papers prepared by scholars in law and other
disciplines.15 The commission’s initial consultations led to the
release of a discussion paper in May 2000 that set out broad
questions about the policy objectives, principles, and legal
modalities that should guide the regulation of close personal

15

Many of the impressive array of background papers prepared for the
L ’s Beyond Conjugality report are available at the Government of
Canada Publications website, online: <www.publications.gc.ca>. They
include Law Commission of Canada, Spousal Testimony in Criminal
Cases, by Allan Manson (Ottawa: LCC, August 2001); Law
Commission of Canada, Registered Partnerships: A Model for
Relationship Recognition, by Nicole LaViolette (Ottawa: LCC, August
2001); Law Commission of Canada, Compensation for Relational
Harm, by Shauna Van Praagh (Ottawa: LCC, July 2001); Law
Commission of Canada, The Evolution and Diversity of Relationships
in Canadian Families, by Teresa Janz (Ottawa: LCC, September
2000); Commission du droit du Canada, Le contrat en contexte
d’intimité, by A Roy (Ottawa: Commission du droit du Canada, June
2001); Law Commission of Canada, The Legal Regulation of Adult
Personal Relationships: Evaluating Policy Objectives and Legal
Options in Federal Legislation, by B Cossman & B Ryder (Ottawa:
LCC, May 2000); Law Commission of Canada, Personal
Relationships of Support Between Adults: The Case of Disability, by
Roeher Institute (Ottawa: LCC, March 2001); Law Commission of
Canada, Close Personal Relationships between Adults: 100 Years of
Marriage in Canada, by K Arnup (Ottawa: LCC, March 2001); Law
Commission of Canada, The Benefit/Penalty Unit in Income Tax
Policy: Diversity and Reform, by K Lahey (Ottawa: LCC, September
2000); Law Commission of Canada, Division of Powers and
Jurisdictional Issues Relating to Marriage, by J Fisher, K Lahey & L
Arron, EGALE (Ottawa: LCC, June 2000); Law Commission of
Canada, What’s Sex Got to Do with It? Tax and the “Family”, by C
Young (Ottawa: LCC, May 2000). A full list of the background
research papers that informed the report is included in Beyond
Conjugality, supra note 1 at 148 50.
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relationships between adults. 16 The first two presidents of the
LCC, Roderick Macdonald (who served in this capacity from
1997 2000) and Nathalie Des Rosiers (2000 2004), were
instrumental in shaping the expansive vision that animated the
commission’s investigations into the legal regulation of adult
personal relationships. Under their leadership, the LCC engaged
a multidisciplinary study panel of researchers with a
commitment to tailoring the law’s objectives and reach to
measurable social conditions. 17 The LCC’s work was also
guided by its commissioners, a citizens’ Advisory Council, 18
and extensive public consultations. 19 When the commission
identified gaps in its research, or other flaws in its draft reports,
it would seek additional input from scholars and other advisers.
The collaborative and collective nature of the commission’s
work, drawing upon and constantly informed by a wide range of
interdisciplinary expertise, was impressive and made working
with the commission a particularly enlightening and rewarding
experience.
When we worked with the LCC on researching and
drafting the Beyond Conjugality report, we were instructed not
to concern ourselves with short-term acceptability of the report’s
analysis and recommendations. The LCC emphasized that its
goal was to issue a report that explored fundamental questions
in an innovative manner, would stand the test of time, and might
be influential a few generations down the road. The impressive
and growing body of scholarship in Canada and abroad engaging
16

Law Commission of Canada, Recognizing and Supporting Close
Personal Relationships Between Adults: Discussion Paper (Ottawa:
Public Works and Government Services Canada, May 2000).

17
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with the principles and methodology of the Beyond Conjugality
report suggests that it is contributing to debates in the manner
the LCC sought.20
20
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Notwithstanding its admirable research process,
important and original contributions to scholarship, and
principled commitment to its statutory mandate, the LCC paid a
high political price for its critical assessment of the legal value
of conjugality as a category of regulation. Stinging from the
removal of the legal barrier to same-sex marriage, in 2006 the
newly-elected Conservative government cancelled funding to
the Court Challenges Program (which supported litigation
invoking constitutional equality or language rights). At the same
time, the government cut all funding to the LCC, forcing it to
shut down its operations even though the government did not
introduce a bill to repeal the LCC’s constituent statute.21 The
LCC still exists, at least in the statute book, which sustains hope
that it might rise again from the ashes.22
ross
he urden of onjugality in
re s ed Diversity and
European Human Rights: Rewriting Judgments of the ECHR
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013) 265; Amanda Head,
he Legal Recognition of lose Personal Relationshi s in ew South
Wales
ase for Refor
11 1 1 linders L
argaret
riggs Rethin ing Relationshi s
1
LR 9 Melina
Constantine Bell, ender ssentialis and
erican Law hy and
How to Se er the onnection (2016) 23:2 Duke J Gender L & Pol’y
163.
21
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conclude that the go ern ent’s action on the Law o
ission is
flouting the authority of the House. While members may have deep
concerns about the decision to no longer fund the Law Commission of
Canada this decision does not constitute a reach of ri ilege. House
of Commons Debates, 39th Parl, 1st Sess, No 65 (19 October 2006) at
4105.
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In his appearance before the House of Commons
Standing Committee on Justice and Human Rights in 2006, then
Justice Minister Vic Toews said cutting the LCC’s entire budget
was simply an efficiency measure undertaken to save 3.2 million
dollars of taxpayers’ money. The elimination of funding was
justified, he said, because there was nothing the Law
Commission of Canada did that was particularly unique or that
could not and was not being carried out by other institutions. 23
He characterized the LCC as simply . . . an administrative
mechanism to hire individuals to do research. 24 Conservative
supporters of the cancellation of funding frequently cited the
LCC’s temerity in questioning the state’s role in relation to
LS 117. See also Roderic
acdonald Reco
issioning Law
Refor
1997
lta L Re 8 1 at 87 7
the edagogic and
therapeutic roles of law reform are precisely to challenge the manner
in which a problem is presented . . . Law reform is about asking better
questions. . . . [b]reaking free of posited sources of law and enacted
doctrinal categories is a key task for any recommissioned law reform
agency.
23
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marriage as reason enough for shutting it down. The Beyond
Conjugality report featured highly in their critique before and
after the government’s cuts were announced. 25 Indeed,
supporters of legal marriage as the privileged and exclusive
domain of opposite-sex couples have frequently decried what
they see as the radical potential of the report.26
The LCC’s resistance in its work on Beyond Conjugality
to short-term political pressures, its focus on seeking to
25

Iain Benson said the re ort was not well done ecause it failed to
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Carpay, the executive director of the Canadian Constitution
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contribute to reframing questions and reshaping discourse over
the long term, the breadth of its consultations and
interdisciplinary research in other words, its integrity and
fidelity to its constitutive legislation were precisely the
features of its work that spelled its doom when a Conservative
government with a strikingly neo-liberal, managerial, and antiintellectual approach to governance was elected in 2006.27
27

As Liberal Member of Parliament Derek Lee commented in the House
of Commons when the government cut funding to the Court Challenges
Program and the LCC,
I recall the report from the Law Commission entitled
Beyond Conjugality’. It was a discussion of the law
relating to spousal and non-spousal relationships. Part of
the discussion dealt with many of the same-sex marriage
issues which this House has dealt with. I could not help
but detect some disfavour on the part of many
Conservative members about it. I have seen it at the
justice committee. It is not always on the record, but it is
there. The court challenges program brings court charter
challenges into the courts. Members will recall the same
sex marriage issue, the redevelopment of the definition of
civil marriage, was accomplished primarily as a result of
litigation charter challenge. I am not certain whether the
court challenges program funded any of that; it may have,
but it is passing strange. I see a connection there. I
entioned the Law o
ission’s re ort and now the
judges who made these decisions that essentially required
Parliament to act a year or two ago. I have simply had no
choice ut to draw the inference that the onser ati es’
distaste for those decisions was a prime motivator in this,
because I cannot see any economic or fiscal reason to turn
attention to these very viable working mechanisms in our
judicial sector. The Law Commission which is being
scrapped now was the reincarnation of the old Law
Reform Commission, which was scrapped by the
previous Conservative government in 1990 or 1991. A
very strange thing. The Conservatives do not like law
refor co
issions. hey jun the . :
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For those troubled by any disruption of the legal
boundaries of conjugality or of its legal uses, the report amounts
to a radical rethinking of marriage. Ironically, given the LCC’s
efforts to situate the same-sex marriage issue as a modest part of
its broader project of legislative rationalization, its demise was
fuelled by the heightened anxieties of moral conservatives
provoked by the arrival of gays and lesbians into the inner
sanctum of legal marriage.28 But from most other points of view,
a report aimed at achieving legislative rationality to better
achieve liberal principles of equality, autonomy, personal
security, privacy, and efficiency is hardly radical.
III – LEGISLATIVE DEVELOPMENTS SINCE 2001
The bulk of the Beyond Conjugality report a section titled
application of its methodology29 was directed at a detailed
analysis of ten federal statutory contexts to illustrate how the
report’s methodology could lead to reforms that would better
support the principled accomplishment of the state’s objectives
of recognizing and supporting adult personal relationships.
These ten examples were intended to illustrate the benefits of
following the LCC’s four-step methodology to achieve a more
comprehensive and systematic approach to law reform. 30

House of Commons Debates, 39th Parl, 1st Sess, No 80 (9 November
2006) at 4945.
28

The expression and management of anxieties produced by the
reconstitution of legal borders, and the processes of becoming and
unbecoming sexual citizens, is explored in Brenda Cossman, Sexual
Citizens: The Legal and Cultural Regulation of Sex and Belonging
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2007). See especially chapter 4,
ueer as iti ens ibid at 159 93).

29

Beyond Conjugality, supra note 1 at 37 111.

30

Ibid at 37.
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As far as we know, only one of the recommendations
directed at the reform of federal statutes in this part of the report
has been implemented (the repeal of the common law rule that a
married spouse is not a competent witness for the Crown,
discussed below). From the LCC’s perspective aiming to shift
the parameters of debates and reshape the fundamental questions
over the long term this should not be too discouraging. A lack
of immediate legislative adoption of its recommendations could
be seen as much as a sign of success as one of failure.
The only comprehensive and systematic law reforms
undertaken by the Parliament of Canada in this area over the past
few decades have been those aimed at the ongoing project of
bringing cohabiting opposite-sex couples and same-sex couples
within the conjugal space previously reserved for married
opposite-sex couples. While the LCC strongly supported these
trajectories toward a non-discriminatory conception of
conjugality, it was more focused on decentring conjugality from
legal regulation. In this sense, from a federal legislative
perspective, the aftermath of the Beyond Conjugality report has
been precisely what it feared and the opposite of what it sought
to achieve: the legal definition of coupled conjugality has been
extended to the previously excluded and as a result has become
more deeply entrenched at the heart of the state’s approach to
relationship recognition and support.31
31

Human rights discourse has played a significant role in directing and
limiting legislative reform of the coupled conjugal regime. Prohibitions
on sexual orientation and marital status discrimination have been
enlisted effectively by same-sex couples and unmarried opposite-sex
couples respectively to achieve inclusion. Non-conjugal cohabitants
and those living in plural conjugal relationships have not yet had the
same kind of success invoking prohibitions on discrimination or other
human rights to challenge their exclusion from legal rights or benefits.
Their relative absence from relationship regulation rules is mirrored by
a similar absence from human rights law so far. See, for example, the
rejection of the challenge brought by two cohabiting sisters to
inheritance tax laws in Burden v The United Kingdom, No 13378/05,
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Indeed, the conservative anxieties provoked by the
achievement of equal coupled conjugality led the federal
government headed by Prime Minister Harper to focus on
finding new barbarians at the gates, and on shoring up or at
least creating the perception of shoring up the remaining
borders of entry to conjugality based on age, voluntary and
informed consent, and dyadic or coupled relationships. Thus, to
[2008] III ECHR 357, 47 EHRR 38 [GC]. For similar stories in
anada see assie illia s
o a Scotia Sisters ho’ e Li ed
ogether 8 ears ant Sur i or enefits CBC News (28 October
2016), online: <www.cbc.ca>. See also the comments of cohabiting
twin sisters included in Beyond Conjugality, supra note 1 at 119. On
the rights of polya orists see
lison
rawford
anadian
Polya orists ace ni ue Legal hallenges Research Re eals CBC
News 1 Se te er 1
he urrent Polya orous a ilies
ant anadian Law to atch u with heir Relationshi s
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ward off the new threats to conjugality apparently posed by child
marriage, forced marriage, and plural marriage, and to position
them clearly as uncivilized and unenlightened practices of
cultural outsiders, in 2015 Parliament passed the Zero Tolerance
for Barbaric Cultural Practices Act. 32 It amended the Civil
Marriage Act by adding these provisions:
2.1 Marriage requires the free and enlightened consent
of two persons to be the spouse of each other.
2.2 No person who is under the age of 16 years may
contract marriage.
2.3 No person may contract a new marriage until every
previous marriage has been dissolved by death or by
divorce or declared null by a court order.
A further example of the federal government’s lack of
interest in displacing conjugality from the heart of legal
regulation of relationships are the 2015 amendments to the
evidentiary rules regarding spousal competence and
compellability, and to the marital communications privilege.33
The LCC recommended the repeal of the common law rule of
spousal incompetence on the grounds that the rationale for the
rule a spouse’s testimonial choices should not be allowed to
put his or her marriage at risk is inconsistent with values of
equality and autonomy and therefore no longer legitimate.34 As
for the rule that a spouse is not a compellable witness, and the
marital communications privilege, the LCC recommended that
these rules should be more flexible and should extend to a wide
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range of close personal relationships. 35 In the Commission’s
view, judges should have discretion, in the particular
circumstances of a case, to decide whether the harm caused to
the witness or to the relationship by having to testify or disclose
communications outweighs the desirability of admitting the
testimony.36
Judges have frequently criticized the incoherence of the
existing spousal testamentary rules and noted the need for
Parliament to revise them. 37 Some courts have found that the
prohibition on marital status discrimination in the Charter
requires that the marital communications privilege be extended
to unmarried conjugal cohabitants.38 Courts divided on whether
the now-repealed rule regarding spousal non-compellability was
constitutionally sound: some found it discriminatory and
extended it to unmarried cohabitants;39 others found the special
treatment given to married spouses to be justifiable under section
1 of the Charter.40
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Rather than enter into the complications of defining the
relevant close relationships, and balancing the goal of supporting
those relationships with the state interest in prosecuting crime,
Parliament chose a blunter approach. It used the Victims Bill of
Rights Act to repeal the rule of spousal non-compellability and
show that its commitment to facilitating prosecutions and
supporting victims of crime outstrips its commitment to
supporting marriage (or at least the marriages of those accused
of crime). While married spouses are now competent and
compellable witnesses against their spouses at the behest of the
prosecution, Parliament left the marital communications
privilege in section 4(3) of the Canada Evidence Act 41 intact,
despite the findings of the LCC 42 and some courts43 that it is
under inclusive because it promotes trust and candour only in
marital relationships, and thus discriminates on the basis of
marital status.
While the comprehensive approach to federal law
reform set out in the Beyond Conjugality report has thus far had
little concrete success, one can discern some glimmers of its
recommended attention to the rights of non-conjugal cohabitants
by provincial legislatures. 44 Most provinces, like the federal
Parliament, have enacted legislation to remove barriers to the
equal treatment of conjugal couples,45 but have not pursued law
reforms to include non-conjugal cohabitants. Alberta notably
41
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took a step towards the recognition of the rights of non-conjugal
cohabitants in 2002 with the passage of the Adult Interdependent
Relationships Act. 46 The Act defines adult independent
partners (AIP) as two people who have entered into an AIP
agreement, or, if they are not related to each other by blood or
adoption, have lived together in a
relationship of
interdependence for three years, or have a child through birth
or adoption.47 A relationship of interdependence is defined as
one in which any two persons share one another’s lives , are
emotionally committed to each other , and function as an
economic and domestic unit . 48 To assist judges in deciding
when two people are functioning as the required economic and
domestic unit , the legislation provides a list of relevant factors,
such as the degree of emotional and economic support they
provide each other, the degree of exclusivity of the relationship,
and the degree they hold themselves out to the public as a unit.49
The existence of a conjugal element to the relationship which
presumably means whether they have sex is but one factor
listed.50
The passage of the Alberta legislation was motivated by
the desire to preserve marriage and spousal status exclusively as
the domain of opposite-sex couples, safe from gay and lesbian
invaders. 51 Hence, the new status of AIPs: if two people are
46
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AIPs, they are accorded some of the same rights as married
spouses in Alberta.
Some scholars have praised the passage of the Alberta
legislation as an important step forward. For example, Nancy
Polikoff, in her book urging governments to shift their approach
to valuing all committed family relationships, wrote that
Canada will achieve even greater justice for all families if the
law embraces the principles of the Beyond Conjugality report
and considers the Alberta Adult Interdependent Relationships
Act a model from which to build other protections for
nonconjugal relationships. 52
Others are not so sure. Lois Harder, for example, is more
ambivalent. She agrees that the legal recognition of nonconjugal
relationships poses a radical challenge to the presumed
naturalness and ensuing privilege of the heteronormative
married family. She also worries that the recognition of AIPs is
more consistent with a neo-liberal agenda of privatizing support
than it is with achieving other goals: policy makers are more
interested in establishing a social order in which private
obligations between citizens are reinforced and social outlays
are reduced than they are in ensuring the autonomy of citizens
or limiting their vulnerability. 53
law
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Relationships Act; most of the cases involve claimants seeking
access to support from an alleged AIP or to dependants’ relief
under an alleged AIP’s will. 54 It is striking how similar the
situations of claimants on the borders of conjugality is in this
context to the account of the lives of claimants in the income tax
case law compiled by Kim Brooks.55 In one context, claimants
seek recognition as AIPs to qualify for privatized benefits; in the
other, they sought exclusion from conjugality to qualify for tax
credits they would be denied if they had to report the income of
an alleged common law spouse. In either context, one can see
that the boundaries between AIP and non-AIP, between conjugal
and non-conjugal, are elusive, unstable, and shift in peoples’
lives. Brooks observes that [m]any people move along the
spectrum of relationship proximity over the course of their
relationship , engaging in some practices (like living together or
having sex) at some points in time but not others. 56
While the recognition of AIPs in Alberta legislation is
an innovative development on the books, it may be that it plays
out in unmarried people’s lives in a way that is essentially
similar to how the conjugal/non-conjugal divide does. We have
noted elsewhere that having sex is no longer a requirement for
recognition as a conjugal cohabitant in Canada.57 As a result, the
lines between conjugal and non-conjugal relationships are
54
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blurring if not dissolving altogether. 58 As the meaning of
conjugality and non-conjugality are subtly redefined and
transformed in the application and interpretation of law to the
murkiness of people’s actual relationships, the law is creeping
incrementally beyond conjugality as the LCC imagined it.59
IV – BEYOND THE CONJUGAL COUPLE
The LCC’s analysis in Beyond Conjugality was aimed at
decentring conjugality in legal regulation by encouraging a
58
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range of self-designation mechanisms and, where that is not
feasible, adopting definitions of the relevant relationships
tailored to the accomplishment of legislative objectives in
specific contexts.60 But an important question left lingering over
much of the discussion and the solutions proposed was whether
the LCC intended legal regulation to move beyond its focus on
the dyad or couple.
The logic of the report, fuelled by the principles of
equality, autonomy, and state neutrality it articulated,61 pointed
towards the legal recognition and support of interdependent
relationships of all shapes and sizes. Moreover, many of the
solutions that the LCC proposed had the potential to apply
beyond the dyad.62 Still, there were many obvious ways in which
the report remains shackled within a dyadic concept of marriage,
conjugality, and even non-conjugality. The discussion of
marriage in the final chapter of the report epitomized the
monogamous, dyadic conception of relationships within which
we were working. While the LCC considered a range of
controversial options, such as getting the state out of marriage
altogether, marriage remained defined as monogamous. Indeed,
the only reference in the report to polygamy was in a footnote
60
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and it bracketed the question for the future: [i]n this report, the
Law Commission of Canada does not address the issue of
polygamy. 63
The report’s discussion of registration regimes was
somewhat more open-ended. It never stated that registration
should be limited to couples, but the question was again only
addressed awkwardly in a footnote: in principle, the Law
Commission sees no reason to limit registration to two people. 64
Yet the examples provided three siblings or four
housemates steered clear of non-dyadic conjugal
relationships. It is perhaps more than a little ironic that in a report
intended to think beyond conjugality the LCC was able to allude
to multiple relationship recognition only in a non-conjugal
context.
Clearly, the LCC had chosen to avoid the question of
plural relationships, particularly in a conjugal context. The
decision was a conscious and politically pragmatic one: the
report was already controversial and subject to harsh critiques
from left and right alike. Same-sex marriage remained politically
divisive and its future far from certain. The allegation from
moral conservatives of an inevitable slippery slope from samesex marriage to polygamy created a real political challenge for
equal marriage advocates. Moreover, as the reaction to the
release of the report discussed above made clear, the idea of
critiquing conjugality itself was provocative. The idea of
fundamentally rethinking the way government regulated
relationships the very objective of the report was on the
cutting edge of the imaginable. The LCC did not believe that it
63
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could throw polygamy or polyamory into this politically
explosive mix. All of us who worked on the report understood
that the choice to exclude multiparty adult conjugal relationships
was an obvious omission. We dodged the issue of poly
relationships. We would not do so today.
(A) DEFINITIONS OF CLOSE PERSONAL
RELATIONSHIPS
Yet, as we return to the report’s four-step methodology and the
tailored definitions for the recognition of adult personal
relationships that emerged in the application section, many
have the potential to apply to multiple party relationships
whether conjugal or not. Indeed, several of the report’s actual
recommendations did apply beyond the dyadic couple to
potentially multiple party relationships, although these were
largely framed in terms of non-conjugal relationships. Many of
the report’s suggested solutions could be applied to polyamorous
spouses provided that they fit the definition of economic and
emotional interdependence. The LCC did not frame the report in
this way; it did not give these kinds of examples. But, if we were
to take a polyamorous relationship, and work the relationship
through the proposed redefinitions of relevant relationships,
many would qualify for inclusion in the legal rights or
obligations at issue.
The four basic questions could and should be applied to
multiparty relationships. The first two questions is the law
itself legitimate and are relationships relevant would apply
equally to dyadic and multiple party relationships. Indeed, the
number of individuals in a relationship is, we believe, entirely
irrelevant to these first two questions.
The third question asked whether, instead of having
government decide in advance which relationships are included,
it is possible to redesign the law or program to allow individuals
to designate the relationships that are most important to them
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and ought to be included. This question regarding the possibility
of self-designation could be applied to multiple party
relationships.
Indeed, the LCC did apply this third question to multiple
party relationships. Consider for example the LCC’s
recommendation regarding immigration and family sponsorship.
The current regime allows individuals to sponsor a relatively
narrow list of family members as accompanying dependents
or as within the family class . These included the sponsor’s
spouse, fiancé(e), dependent children, parents, grandparents,
siblings, nieces/nephews, grandchildren under the age of
majority, or one more distant relative if the sponsor does not
have any close family members in Canada. Instead, the LCC
recommended that individuals be allowed to decide for
themselves which relationships are most important to them,
regardless of marital, conjugal, or blood relationships. 65
However, the report also recommended that the definition not be
entirely open-ended. In order to avoid possible abuse of the
immigration system, by allowing individuals to sponsor virtual
strangers who would then be able to jump the queue , the report
suggested two possible approaches. On the first approach, the
self-designation would be limited to persons who were known
and emotionally important to the sponsor.66 Or alternatively, a
slightly more restrictive option would allow designation of
persons who have had a close personal relationship
characterized by emotional or economic interdependence for at
least one year. 67
65
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Either of these self-designations would apply beyond
conjugal and blood relationships. They were intended to allow
individuals to decide for themselves who is most important to
them. Moreover, they were never intended to be restricted to the
dyadic couple: the nature of the immigration sponsorship regime
is to allow individuals to bring a range of family members.
Although the definition of spouse was itself restricted at the
time to opposite-sex couples there is no reason that the new
definition of individuals who are known and emotionally
important or in a close personal relationship would not apply
beyond this traditional definition. The report imagined the
inclusion of same-sex couples within the definition of spouse, as
well as unmarried couples (at the time of writing in 2001, both
would be included in the new Immigration and Refugee
Protection Act 68 that was about to be passed by Parliament).
Individuals in multiple party conjugal relationships would
certainly fall within the definition of known and emotionally
important and/or in a close personal relationship . The only
obstacle to the recognition of multiple party conjugal
relationships under this definition resides elsewhere: the
prohibition on polygamy and other plural conjugal unions in
section 293 of the Criminal Code. If this prohibition were
removed, there would be no reason that an individual in a
polygamous or polyamorous relationship would not be able to
sponsor their partners.
The fourth step of the report’s proposed methodology,
and some of the tailored definitions it pointed to in the
application section, could also be applied to polyamorous
relationships. At this stage, the report asked if relationships
matter, and self-designation is not feasible or appropriate, is
there a better way to include relationships? 69 More specifically,
68
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the LCC considered ways to include relationships where
individuals had not self-designated, or self-designation was not
feasible, but where inclusion of emotionally or economically
interdependent relationships was important to the state’s
interests in recognizing and supporting the full range of
committed, mutually supportive personal adult relationships. 70
Some of the LCC’s recommendations regarding
targeted definitions would, we believe, also apply to multiple
party relationships. Consider for example the LCC’s
recommendations regarding the Bank Act and the avoidance of
conflict of interest. The existing definition of related parties
applied to spouses, common law partners, and minor children.
Other individuals in a close personal relationship with bank
officials were not covered by the conflict of interest rules,
creating a regime that was obviously under-inclusive. The
Commission recommended that the definition be broadened to
include individuals in a close personal relationship. 71 The
definition thereby included individuals in an emotional or
economically interdependent relationship, beyond marriage,
conjugality, and blood. It is a definition that we believe would
and should equally apply to multiple party conjugal
relationships. Individuals in a polygamous or polyamorous
relationships would be in an obvious conflict of interest position
vis-à-vis any of their multiple partners. Once again, the only
obstacle to their recognition is the law’s prohibition on
polygamy and polyamory. However, in this instance, excluding
these multiple spouses rather obviously undermines the law’s
interest in preventing conflicts of interest.
There are many more recommendations in the report
regarding a broad range of federal laws. Although the LCC did
not frame the report in this way, we believe that asking the four
70
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questions and applying the recommendations to polygamous
and polyamorous relationships would result in their inclusion,
from a policy perspective. If individuals are living in
emotionally and economically interdependent relationships, the
same rationales apply regardless of conjugal, marital, or blood
relationships. Polygamous and polyamorous spouses largely live
in these kinds of emotionally and economically interdependent
relationships, and their exclusion from rights and responsibilities
undermines a range of important and legitimate government
objectives. Their exclusion also runs counter to the principles of
equality, autonomy, and state neutrality articulated in the report:
the state ought to support any and all relationships that have the
capacity to further relevant social goals, and to remain neutral
with respect to individuals’ choice of a particular form or
status. 72
(B) THE LEGAL ORGANIZATION OF PERSONAL
RELATIONSHIPS
If it were up to us, we would urge the LCC to write the report
differently today. We would tackle the dyadic conception of
conjugality throughout the development of the report’s
principles, methodology, and application, although the solutions
and definitions adopted might not change dramatically. But, it is
the final chapter of the report on the state’s role in committed
relationships that would present the biggest challenge. As
described above, the report was written at a particular political
moment where public debate about whether the state should
recognize same-sex marriage was intense. The LCC’s position
was clearly yes, so long as the state stays in the marriage
business, it should recognize same-sex marriage even as it
rethought conjugality as the basis for the distribution of rights
and responsibilities. Fast forward to 2017, and the legal right to
a civil same-sex marriage has been a national reality for more
than a decade. What would a chapter on the state’s role in
72
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committed relationships look like now, more than a decade after
the legal recognition of same-sex marriage? We can of course
only address what we would do differently, not speculate what
the LCC (if resurrected) might do differently.
Most obviously, we would not relegate polygamy to a
footnote. Rather, we would address polygamous and
polyamorous relationships, and the extent to which the criminal
law continues to target non-monogamous intimate relationships
through section 293 of the Criminal Code. In telling the history
of marriage, we would broaden the narrative to include the
history of polygamous and monogamous marriage, drawing on
the materials produced for and cited in the Polygamy
Reference.73 While the British Columbia Supreme Court upheld
the constitutionality of section 293 in the Polygamy Reference,
we do not believe that the ruling is or should be the final word
on the constitutionality and/or political legitimacy of the
continued criminalization of polygamy in Canada. 74 In law
73
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report fashion, we would consider the arguments for and against
the criminal prohibition and the non-recognition of polygamous
relationships in Canadian law.75 While the federal and provincial
governments have argued that the protection of women and
children is a legitimate state objective justifying the
criminalization of polygamy, we believe that the legislation is
overbroad and disproportionate. Just as the LCC argued that
conjugality was a poor proxy for the relational attributes relevant
to legislative objectives, so we would believe that the criminal
prohibition of polygamy is a poor proxy for achieving legitimate
government objectives. The harms that may come to some
women and children in some polygamous communities could
and should be addressed through more narrowly targeted
regulations, many of which currently exist. Sexual assault,
assault, age of consent, and trafficking laws, to name a few,
could be deployed against harmful practices when evident,
rather than using the criminal prohibition against polygamy as a
proxy for these harms. Moreover, many polygamous and
polyamorous relationships are not characterized by any of these
harms, and yet they are caught by the blanket prohibition on
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multiple party conjugal relationships in section 293 of the
Criminal Code.76
Finally, rethinking the dyadic couple conjugal or
not is not without its conceptual challenges. The rights and
responsibilities within federal jurisdiction were largely public
rights and responsibilities. But, how would we think about the
private rights between the parties? Although within provincial
jurisdiction, the division of marital property illustrates some of
the challenges. Consider a polyamorous family with three adults:
if one party chooses to leave the unit, how would property be
divided? Provincial division of property regimes are predicted
on a sharing of the value of assets between two people. If applied
to the polyamorous family, would the first person to leave be
entitled to one half? Or one third? Should the value of the
property of all three adults be calculated, and a presumption of
equal division be put in place, subject to any revisions agreed to
by the parties in a domestic contract? What if, as in polygamous
relationships, the marriage was between one man and multiple
76
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wives? Would the law consider only the assets held by the
husband, or by all of the sister wives? These are not
unanswerable questions, but they do require taking the poly unit
seriously to consider the appropriate rights and responsibilities.
A not dissimilar scenario would play out in at least a few
areas of federal jurisdiction. How might Canada Pension Plans
credits be divided between multiple spouses? Who would be
entitled to the survivor’s benefit? The report recommended that
the survivor’s benefit be expanded beyond the spousal and
conjugal to allow an individual to designate their beneficiary,
regardless of conjugal or non-conjugal status, provided that they
were in an economically interdependent relationship.
Specifically, the report recommended that [c]ontributors in
non-conjugal relationships should be able to designate the
persons with whom they live in close personal relationships as
their beneficiaries for the survivor’s pension. 77 The
recommendation did not consider multiple spouses. However,
the Commission did consider the implications of individuals
having both a separated spouse and a new common law spouse:
it worried that allowing a designation to the new common law
spouse could disentitle the former spouse, and suggested that
some limitations might need to be imposed such that only a
portion of the benefits could be designated to the new spouse.
But, imagine instead that the competing spouses are not serial
but contemporaneous: there are two or more surviving spouses.
How should the survivor’s benefit be allocated? Equally
amongst the surviving spouses? Can an individual designate one
spouse over the others?
Notwithstanding the challenges of working through
these technical issues, it is clear that the principles that guided
the LCC’s report, and the methodology it proposed, pointed
towards the recognition and support of multiple party conjugal
relationships in a range of contexts. Indeed, once the primary
77
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objective of marriage recognition is conceived of as supporting
committed and caring relationships, it is hard not to see how the
focus on a conjugal dyad can be preserved.
A rewriting of Beyond Conjugality particularly
Chapter Four along these terms would result in the rest of the
report reading somewhat differently. While, as we have just
argued above, many of the redefinitions of adult personal
relationships proposed in the report could apply to poly
relationships, the report did nothing to bring these relationships
into view. A rewriting of Chapter Three would require that these
poly relationships be examined as examples of the application of
the definitions. Our sense is that a consideration of these
relationships would not actually change the definitions, but
rather, that these relationships would simply be brought into
sharper relief.
Yet, it is important to recognize that although much has
changed in the intervening years same sex marriage has been
firmly embedded into Canadian law the central ideas
contained in the report of moving beyond conjugality remain
controversial. And despite the increasing visibility of polygamy
in the Canadian legal context, with multiple law reports,
constitutional challenges,78 and a proliferation of journal articles
and books on the topic, 79 polygamy remains extremely
78
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controversial and divisive with an overwhelming majority of
popular opinion opposing its recognition. We recognize that
rewriting Beyond Conjugality today, with a view to the explicit
inclusion of poly relationships would still risk breaching a taboo
topic in Canadian policy debates and public opinion. However,
the developments in the intervening years have at least made the
idea of the recognition of poly relationships imaginable, if not
uncontroversial.
V – CONCLUSION
More than a decade and a half after its publication, the Law
Commission of Canada’s Beyond Conjugality report remains a
radical vision for reimagining the legal regulation of intimate
relationships. Despite the passage of same-sex marriage laws,
there has been little political appetite for reforming marriage and
conjugality. Indeed, the move by the Conservative government
to use marriage as a wedge issue, including the age of marriage,
marriage fraud, and duress with the Zero Tolerance of Barbaric
Cultural Practices Act80 in 2015, seemed to backfire, as many
have speculated that despite its passage, its anti-immigrant
sentiment contributed to the government’s defeat in the 2015
election. Even anachronistic marriage and divorce laws, like the
consummation of marriage requirements, and fault based
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divorce laws, remain untouched. Marriage and conjugality seem
to remain a third rail in Canadian politics, with little to be gained
by touching them, and much to be lost by doing so.
But, the relevance of the legal regulation of adult
personal relationships has not diminished. From the increasing
visibility of poly families to novel relationships produced
through reproductive technologies, federal, provincial, and
territorial governments will continue to be called upon to
response and regulation, and in the absence of proactive
legislative action, courts will be called upon to adjudicate the
appropriate recognition of these relationships. We would
continue to make the claim that we did fifteen years ago it is
(still) time to fundamentally rethink the way in which Canadian
law regulates adult personal relationships.

